




















SOAS LAW WORKING PAPERS   
School of Law, SOAS 
University of London 
Russell Square, GB-London 
WC1H 0XG, 
www.soas.ac.uk/law 
Abdullahi An-Na'im's Philosophy 
on Islam and Human Rights  
 
Mashood A. Baderin  
 
 
No 10 2010  
This paper can be downloaded from: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/7101/       
Reprinted from: Islam and Human Rights: Selected Essays of Abdullahi An-Na'im. Edited by Mashood A. 
Baderin. Farnham: Ashgate, 2010, pp.xiii-xxxix.  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1638162 
Introduction
Abdullahi An-Na’im’s Philosophy on Islam and Human Rights
	 “I	am	proposing	 the	principles	of	constitutionalism,	human	rights	and	citizenship,	




or	 be	 effective	 without	 the	 security	 and	 stability	 provided	 by	 the	 secular	 state.”	
	 	 	 	 	 	 -	Abdullahi	An-Na’im.
The	relationship	between	Islam	and	human	rights	forms	an	important	aspect	
of	 contemporary	 international	human	 rights	discourse.	Current	 international	
events	and	the	increasing	public	role	of	Islam	in	modern	Muslim	states	have	
made	 the	 subject	more	 relevant	 than	ever.	Many	 international	human	 rights	
courses	around	the	world	now	cover	issues	relating	to	Islam	and	human	rights.	
Some universities and academic centres have specific postgraduate courses or 







jurists	 from	 “the	 South”	 “who	 have	 made	 substantial	 contributions	 to	 the	
theory	and	practice	of	human	rights”	generally.	It	is	therefore	a	great	honour	
to	be	commissioned	to	compile	and	write	an	introduction	to	a	selection	of	his	
	 This	 introductory	 chapter	 and	 revision	 of	 manuscript	 for	 this	 volume	 was	






	 A.A.	An-Na’im,	 Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a	
(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	008)	p.	44.
	 W.	Twining,	“Human	Rights:	Southern	Voices;	Frances	Deng,	Abdullahi	An-Na’im,	
Yash	Ghai	and	Upendra	Baxi”	 (007)		Law, Social Justice & Global Development 
Journal (LGD)	http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/007_/twining	at	p.	.	
(Last	accessed	6	December	008)	




access	 and	 convenience	 to	 students,	 academics,	 researchers,	 practitioners,	
policy-makers	and	all	those	interested	in	this	important	subject	area.
The	 quotation	 at	 the	 top	 of	 this	 introductory	 chapter	 is	 taken	 from	An-
Na’im’s	latest	book,	Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating The Future of 







on	 the	 subject,	 this	 volume	 presents	 sixteen	 of	 his	 scholarly	 journal	 essays	
published	between	986	and	006	illustrating	the	progression	and	consistency	
of	 his	 arguments	 over	 a	 period	 of	 twenty	 years.	 The	 essays	 are	 presented	
herein,	not	chronologically,	but	coherently,	in	a	way	that	takes	the	reader	on	a	
scholarly	journey	through	An-Nai’m’s	general	philosophy	on	Islam	and	human	














nation-state	 particularly in modern Muslim states. Read together, the five 
essays in this part reflect An-Na’im’s perception of the position of Islam in 




The	 usual	 starting	 point	 of	 human	 rights	 discourse	 is	 the	 question	 of	 its	
universality. The first United Nations (UN) human rights instrument adopted 
















prevalent	 in	 the	countries	of	Western	Europe	and	America?	…Today	 the	problem	
is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	the	Declaration	must	be	of	world-wide	applicability.	







influence globally, those questions have not been fully subdued in international 
human	rights	discourse	and,	in	relation	to	the	socio-cultural	and	politico-legal	





49	American Anthropologist, pp. 9–4,	 at	 pp.	 9	 and	4–.	Cf.	 the	999	AAA	
Declaration	on	Anthropology	and	Human	Rights	available	at:	http://www.aaanet.org/
stmts/humanrts.htm	[9//08]	and	K.	Engle,	“From	Scepticism	to	Embrace:	Human	
Rights	 and	 the	American	Anthropological	Association	 from	 947–999”	 (00)	 	
Human Rights Quarterly,	No.,	pp.	6–9,	for	an	analysis	of	the	two	Statements.
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is reflected in the first paragraph of this essay where he states that “[h]uman 









universality. I identify this as the first element of his general philosophy on 
Islam and human rights. In relation to Islam, he reflects this philosophy of 
cross-cultural	 universality	 in	 the	 last	 paragraph	 of	 the	 essay	 wherein	 he	





genuine	 universal	 respect	 and	 validity	 through	 discourse	 and	 dialogue”	 (p.	
128). Between the first paragraph earlier quoted and this last paragraph of 
the	essay,	An-Na’im	clearly	articulates	his	views	on	 the	different	paradoxes	
raised	by	the	question	of	universality	in	theory	and	practice.	He	emphasises	






realisation of a cross-cultural universality of human rights? An-Na’im identifies 
that	in	“[r]eading	the	Qur’an	and	Sunna, one will find authority for liberalism 
as	well	 as	 conservatism,	 and	Muslim	 history	 gives	 clear	 examples	 of	 both	
tendencies”.	This	matter,	 he	 argues	 “is	 determined	 by	 the	 choices	Muslims	
make,	 and	 the	 struggle	 they	 wage	 in	 favour	 of	 their	 choices,	 in	 their	 own	
historical	context”	(p.	).	Thus,	for	Islam	to	be	able	to	make	a	meaningful	
contribution	 to	 the	 dialogue	 for	 cross-cultural	 universality	 of	 human	 rights,	
xviiAbdullahi An-Na’im
Muslims	 must,	 in	 the	 view	 of	An-Na’im,	 choose	 liberal	 interpretations	 of	





Challenge and Response”, was first published in 1987. In it An-Na’im proposes 
“solutions	to	the	drawbacks	of	historical	Shari’a	from	a	religious	rather	than	




observes,	inter alia,	in	that	regard	that	“because	Shari’a signifies the positive 
law	of	historical	 Islam,	 its	general	principles	continue	 to	bind	and	motivate	
Muslims”	 (p.	 9)	 and	 that	 the	 appeal	 of	 the	Shari’a	 amongst	 the	majority	
of	Muslims	makes	 it	 imperative	 for	 it	 to	 be	 “authoritatively	 reformed	 from	
within	the	Islamic	traditions	and	in	ways	acceptable	to	Muslims	themselves,	
[o]therwise,	 such	 reform	 would	 lack	 legitimacy	 and	 practical	 viability”	
(p.	9).	He	also	notes,	however,	that	“although	Muslims	will	not	accept	secular	
reforms	to	their	religious	law	and	practice,	they	have	made	some	concessions	




in accordance with Islamic law” (p. 320). However, in his view, “[f]ulfilling 
that	 obligation	 by	 re-introducing	 historical	Shari’a	 would	 be	 disastrous	 for	
international	relations	and	human	rights”	(p.	0).	He	therefore	proposes	that	
“the Muslims’ religious duty may be satisfied by applying a modern version of 
Islamic	law	that	is	consistent	with	peaceful	international	relations	and	respect	
for	human	rights”	and	that	“[t]his	modern	version	will	[still]	be	Islamic	Shari’a	




“[m]odern jurists must not confine Islam to [historical] Shari’a”,	noting	that	










reintroduce	 historical	 public	 Shari’a	 today	 because	 it	 is	 inconsistent	 with	
prevailing	human	rights	standards”	(p.	).	But	he	also	argues	conversely	that	
“[w]hile	this	Article	criticizes	historical	public	Shari’a	as	being	inconsistent	
with prevailing human rights standards, it does not unqualifiedly endorse those 
standards	 that	originated	with	 the	western	 liberal	 tradition”	(p.	).	Rather	
he	proposes	solutions	from	within	Islam,	stating	that	a	“legitimate	and	lasting	
constitutional	and	legal	order	that	can	address	modern	international	relations	












further in the third essay, “A Kinder, Gentler Islam?” first published in 1991. In 
this	essay,	he	argues	essentially	for	a	kinder,	gentler	interpretation	of	the	Islamic	
sources.	The	essay	is	framed	in	the	context	of	right	to	self-determination	and	
principle	 of	 reciprocity.	Here,	An-Na’im	 focuses	 on	 “the	 need	 to	 transform	
the	historical	 traditions	of	Muslim	peoples	 in	ways	 that	would	enable	 them	
to	exercise	 their	 legitimate	rights	 to	self-determination	without	violating	the	
rights of others” (p. 4). He identifies with the fact that Muslim peoples have 
the right to choose an Islamic definition of their self but argues that this should 
not	be	by	reference	to	what	he	calls	“historical	Shari’a”;	a	point	he	made	in	
the	previous	essay	and	consistently	reiterates	in	other	essays	contained	in	this	
volume and throughout his writings. He proposes here that self definition by 
Muslims must be properly clarified and updated, for which he asserts again 
that	 “the	 Islamic	 tradition	must	undergo	 its	own	 reformation	and	develop	a	
modern	conception	of	Shari’a	that	can	be	implemented	today”	(p.	8).	He	again	
acknowledges	that	the	norms	of	“historical	Shari’a”	were	far	more	enlightened	







addressed	 to	Shari’a	 in	 its	 own	 proper	 historical	 context	 but	 rather	 against	
those	who	wish	to	resurrect	dated	concepts	and	principles	and	implement	them	
under	radically	transformed	domestic	and	international	conditions”	(p.	).	
In	An-Na’im’s	 view	 it	 is	 possible,	 indeed	 imperative,	 “to	 develop	 a	 new	
version	of	Shari’a	based	on	a	modern	interpretation	of	the	sources	of	Islam”	
(p.	)	 in	ways	 that	would	promote	a	kinder,	gentler	 Islam.	He	 states:	 “Far	
from	 advocating	 the	 abandonment	 of	 the	 Islamic	 tradition,	 I	 am	 calling	 on	

















identity	without	 violating	 the	 right	 of	 self-determination	 of	 others”	 (p.	 6).	
Failing	 that,	he	 states	 in	conclusion	 that	he	“as	an	Arabized	Muslim	whose	
loyalty	is	to	the	cause	of	justice	and	peace	for	all	Sudanese,	would	rather	live	
in	a	secularised	Sudan	than	in	one	ruled	by	totalitarian	Islamic	Shari’a”	(p.	6),	
thereby introducing a refined argument for secularism which appears to be a 
departure	from	his	previous	position	that	secularism	may	lack	legitimacy	and	
practical	viability	for	his	proposed	reforms	in	Muslim	societies.8 This refined 
position	of	secularism	is	pursued	further	by	him	in	the	next	essay.




(p.	 6)	 after	 the	 overthrow	 of	 Saddam	Hussein’s	 Ba’athist	 regime	 in	 Iraq.	





provide his reflections on that point from an Islamic perspective. 
In addressing the issue of Islam versus secularism, An-Na’im first argues 
that	“[t]he	commonly	presumed	incompatibility	between	Islam	and	secularism	
needs to be re-evaluated” (p. 36). He observes that there is both a definitional 










religion and the state, rather than a specific way in which that relationship has 
evolved	in	one	society	or	another”.	After	that	terminological	deconstruction	of	













for	 the	state	 to	enact	 the	Shari’a	 into	positive	 law	as	 that	would	 lead	 to	 the	
selection	 of	 some	 opinions	 over	 others	 by	 the	 state	 and	 consequently	 deny	
Muslims	 the	 freedom	to	 follow	other	equally	 legitimate	 Islamic	opinions	of	





philosophy of re-affirming secularism for Muslim states, which I identify 
as	 the	 third	 element	 of	 his	 general	 philosophy	 on	 Islam	 and	 human	 rights.	
xxiAbdullahi An-Na’im
It is important to bear in mind An-Na’im’s redefinition of secularism in this 
context.
To	 drive	 his	 arguments	 home,	 he	 gives	 some	 examples	 of	 the	 issue	 of	
women’s	 rights	 in	 Egypt	 and	 of	 Islamic	 identity	 in	 the	 Sudan	 and	 Iran	 to	
illustrate	that	a	“secular	space”	is	necessary	for	the	realisation	and	enjoyment	









human rights and secularism help Muslims avoid the difficult choice of either 







The	 essay,	 “Islam	 and	Human	 Rights:	 Beyond	 the	Universality	 Debate”,	




human	 rights	 norms	 in	 any	 society	 requires	 thoughtful	 and	 well-informed	




human	 rights	 scholars	and	advocates	 to	continue	 to	dismiss	 them	simply	as	
irrelevant, insignificant, or problematic” (p. 95). In relation to the universality 
debate,	he	then	raises	the	question	of	“whether	the	secular	Western	origin	of	







concludes,	 inter alia,	 that	 “universality	 of	 human	 rights	 must	 be	 realized	




II. Islam and Human Rights in the Muslim World
Today,	the	Muslim	world	may	be	perceived	narrowly	in	the	geographical	sense	
of	modern	Muslim	states	or	broadly	 in	a	diasporic	sense	 to	 include	Muslim	
peoples	 living	 as	 minorities	 in	 different	 non-Muslim	 states	 worldwide.	 In	
either	case,	the	relationship	between	Islam	and	human	rights	is	often	an	issue.	
In the five essays in this part An-Na’im addresses, respectively, some of the 




Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives”, which was first published in 
990.	In	this	essay	An-Na’im	presents	a	preliminary	enquiry	on	the	practice	
of	human	rights	in	the	Muslim	world	in	the	geographic	sense.	The	essay	starts	
by defining the Shari’a	 as	 a	 historical	 formulation	 of	 Islamic	 religious	 law	
and	acknowledges	its	legitimising	role	in	Muslim	states.	An-Na’im	reiterates	
his	argument	on	the	need	for	the	cultural	legitimacy	for	human	rights	stating	
that human rights violations in a particular society is often a reflection of “the 
lack	 or	 weakness	 of	 cultural	 legitimacy	 of	 international	 standards	 in	 [that]	










system of the land” in many Muslim countries (p. 20). He however identifies 
that there are obvious conflicts between historical Shari’a	and	certain	human	
rights,	especially	women’s	rights	and	the	rights	of	non-Muslims,	and	indicates	









fact	 that	 the	 relationship	between	 Islam	and	human	 rights	 in	Muslim	 states	
is not only influenced by the historical scriptural imperatives of the Shari’a	








contexts	 citing	 practical	 examples	 from	 some	 of	 the	 Muslim	 states	 earlier	
discussed	in	the	essay.
Finally,	 An-Na’im	 addresses	 the	 issue	 of	 Islamic	 reform	 and	 highlights	





it	 challenges	 the	 vested	 interests	 of	 powerful	 forces	 in	 the	 Muslim	 world	
and	may	 upset	male-dominated	 traditional	 political	 and	 social	 institutions”.	
He	 therefore	 states	 that	 “the	 acceptance	 and	 implementation	 of	 this	 reform	
methodology	will	 involve	a	political	struggle	within	Muslim	nations	as	part	
of	a	larger	general	struggle	for	human	rights”.	Based	on	his	conviction	of	“the	






The	 seventh	 essay,	 “Civil	Rights	 in	 the	 Islamic	Constitutional	Traditions:	
Shared Ideals and Divergent Regimes” was first published in 1992. In it An-
Na’im	presents	“an	internal	critique	of	civil	rights	in	the	Islamic	constitutional	






He then asserts that his task “as a Muslim” is “to seek ways of fulfilling this 
obligation	 from	 an	 Islamic	 point	 of	 view”	 (p.	 68).	While	 he	 argues	 that	
“various	 normative	 traditions	may	 legitimately	 pursue	 different	 approaches	
to	 realizing	 the	 shared	 ideals	 of	 human	 dignity,	 liberty	 and	well-being”	 he	
notes	 that	 “these	 approaches	 must	 remain	 open	 to	 criticism	 and	 reform	 in	
order	 to	 ensure	 and	 improve	 their	 practical	 ability	 to	 realize	 these	 ideals”	
(p.	69).	In	relation	to	the	Muslim	world,	he	suggests	that	the	“key	to	conducting	
constructive	discourse	about	civil	rights	in	the	Islamic	constitutional	tradition	
…is	 the	 candid	 admission	 of	 the	 historical	 contradictions	 and	 ambivalence	













theory	 through	a	critical	analysis	of	 the	constitutional	 theory	of	 the	Medina	











cultural	 resource	 to	 legitimize	and	enhance	civil	 rights	 in	 Islamic	societies”	











was first published in 2001. Here, An-Na’im argues that “the wide variety of 
strategies	for	the	effective	and	sustainable	protection	of	[human]	rights	should	
always be determined and implemented in specific local, regional and global 
context”	(p.	70).	He	notes	that	his	particular	concern	in	this	essay	is	“with	
identifying	 and	 promoting	 ways	 of	 diminishing,	 and	 eventfully	 breaking”	
what	 he	 calls	 “human	 rights	 dependency”	 (p.	 70)	 of	 developing	 countries	
on	 international	 pressure	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 human	 rights	 of	 	 their	 own	
people. He identifies the different problems associated with “human rights 
dependency”	 of	 developing	 countries	 and	 proceeds	 to	 engage	 with	 those	
problems.	 He	 restates	 his	 consistent	 position	 that	 “moral	 or	 philosophical	
justifications for the universality of human rights can be found in all major 
religious	 and	 cultural	 traditions	 of	 the	world,	which	 should	 be	 emphasized	
through	an	 internal	discourse	within	each	 tradition	 that	also	addresses	 those	
features	of	the	religion	or	culture	which	are	negative	or	hostile	to	human	rights	
norms”	(p.	70).	
In	 relation	 to	 the	 Arab	 world,	 he	 observes	 that	 “[w]hile	 Islam	 is	 often	
assumed	to	be	a	major	factor	 in	 the	presumed	unity	of	‘Arab	culture’,	 there	




complexity	of	 interests,	as	well	as	 the	diversity	of	factors	and	contexts,	 that	
condition	the	policy	and	practice	of	each	Arab	state,	especially	regarding	the	
protection	of	human	rights”	and	more	particularly	 in	 respect	of	“the	 impact	
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arab nationalism(s), and political Islam on the 
current	 status	and	 future	prospects	of	 the	protection	of	human	 rights	 in	 this	
region”. He notes that “since these factors have been cited as justification 
or	explanation	of	human	rights	violations	at	various	 times	 in	different	Arab	




that “Arab human rights NGOs are consistently denied official registration and 
face	systematic	harassment	by	the	majority	of	the	governments	of	the	region”	
and	 that	 this	 is	 true	both	of	 “traditionalist	purportedly	 Islamic	governments	
like	those	of	the	Gulf	states	and	Saudi	Arabia	or	so-called	secular	governments	
Abdullahi An-Na’imxxvi
like	 those	 of	 Iraq,	 Syria	 and	 Libya”	 (p.	 7).	 In	 analysing	 the	 conceptual	








the	 leaders	 of	 the	 Islamic	 groups”	 and	 that	 “these	 leaders	 of	 human	 rights	
organizations find it difficult to openly challenge calls by Islamic groups for 
the	application	of	 Islamic	Law	(Shari’a)	 for	 fear	of	being	branded	as	 ‘anti-
Islamic’	despite	the	obvious	fundamental	contradictions	between	[historical]	
Shari’a	 principles	 and	 international	 human	 rights	 norms	 on	 such	 issues	 as	
the	 rights	 of	women,	 non-Muslims	 and	 freedom	of	 belief	 among	Muslims”	
(p.	79).	An-Na’im	concludes	this	essay	philosophically	with	the	observation	
that	 the	challenge	 that	ultimately	confronts	human	 rights	 in	 the	Arab	world	
“is	how	to	be	‘visionary	yet	realistic’,	because	there	are	no	‘magic	solutions’	
that	can	materialize	immediately	for	any	of	the	obstacles	and	problems	facing	













world in the diasporic sense, is reflected in An-Na’im’s reference to the fact 
that	some	“Muslim	scholars,	like	late	Fazlur	Rahman	and	Zaki	Badawi,	have	
suggested	 that	 Islamic	renewal	may	come	from	Muslims	 in	 the	West”,	with	
Zaki	 Badawi	 adding	 that	 “the	most	 profound	 formulations	will	 come	 from	
France,	where	Muslims	will	be	challenged	by	the	hardness	of	life,	the	deeply	
held	convictions	of	Republican	secularism,	and	the	depth	of	racism”	(p.	97).	




their historical experiences and specific present context, both types of complex 
Muslim	communities	face	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	Islam	and	
the	state”	(p.	908).	
In relation to France, he identifies that local “Muslim communities are 
currently	 negotiating	 with	 the	 wider	 national	 French	 identity	 and	 culture	
about	 the	 meaning	 	 and	 relevance	 of	 their	 Islamic	 identity	 in	 the	 context	
of	 a	 highly	 developed	 and	 effective	 national	 and	 regional	European	 human	




Soviet-state	 society	 that	 is	 only	 beginning	 to	 discover	 the	 possibilities	 and	
benefits of a human rights framework” (p. 909). Thus, An-Na’im asserts the 
need	 for	Muslims	 to	 “adopt	 a	 human	 rights	 paradigm	 (including	 its	 norms	
and	institutions	and	its	popular	advocacy)	in	order	more	effectively	to	assert	
their	 Islamic	 identity”	 (p.	 940)	 but	 in	 doing	 so	 he	 argues	 that	 “Muslims	 in	
France	and	Uzbekistan	may have to modify aspects of their understanding of 
what an Islamic identity means in the process of claiming that identity in the 




its political and legal efficacy” (p. 910). He also discourses the complexities 
of	 identity	 formation	 and	 transformation,	 Islamic	 identity	 and	 nationality	






of	what	 it	means	 to	 be	 a	Muslim	 precisely	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 claim	 an	
Islamic	 identity	 in	France”	 (p.	97).	With	 regard	 to	Uzbekistan	he	analyses	
the	“role	of	Islam	in	the	social	and	political	transformation	of	the	country	in	
the	post	Soviet	era,	while	highlighting	some	features	that	may	be	relevant	to	
an	assessment	of	 the	possibilities	 and	 limitations	of	using	 the	human	 rights	
paradigm	 in	mediating	 Islamic	 identity	 in	 that	 country”	 (p.	9).	The	essay	







human	 rights	 standards	 and	 institutions,	 into	 their	 own	 identity	 in	 order	 to	
claim	that	identity.	However,	the	paradox	is	resolved	or	mediated	to	the	extent	
that	Muslims	 are	 active	 actors	 in	 (not	 merely	 subjects	 of)	 the	 articulation,	





Often,	when	 discussing	 the	 relationship	 between	 Islam	 and	 human	 rights	
in	Muslim	 societies,	 the	 important	 role	 of	 human	 agency	 is	 often	 not	well	
highlighted	 or	 is	 forgotten	 completely.	This	 is	what	An-Na’im	 addresses	 in	
the	tenth	essay,	“The	Best	of	Times	and	the	Worst	of	Times:	Human	Agency	
and Human Rights in the Islamic Societies”. This was first published in 2004 
during very difficult times for Islam and Muslims generally, principally as a 
consequence	of	reactions	to	the	September		terrorist	attacks	in	the	United	
States	 of	 America	 in	 00.	 An-Na’im	 begins	 this	 essay	 with	 the	 premise	
that	“there	are	good	reasons	for	‘pragmatic	optimism’	about	human	rights	in	







collectively	 or	 institutionally”.	 He	 states	 however	 that	 “outcomes	 are	
contingent	upon	what	Muslims	and	others	make	of	these	opportunities,	hence	








proportion of the field to be overlooked by any systematic study or monitoring 
of	the	status	of	human	rights	around	the	world”	(p.	).	
With	 regard	 to	 the	 role	 of	 human	 agency,	 he	 notes	 that	 the	 question	 of	
the	 relationship	 between	 Islam	 and	 human	 rights	 “can	 be	meaningful	 only	
when	it	is	about	Muslims	not	Islam…	because	“the	question	is	always	about	
people’s	 understanding	 and	 practice	 of	 their	 religion,	 not	 the	 religion	 itself	
xxixAbdullahi An-Na’im
as	an	abstract	notion,	and	about	human	rights	as	a	living	and	evolving	body	
of	 principles	 and	 rule,	 not	 as	 a	 theoretical	 concept”.	He	 argues	 further	 that	
“[w]hether	 regarding	 religion	or	human	rights,	 reference	 to	states,	countries	
or	international	organizations	like	the	United	Nations	is	really	to	people	who	






of	Muslims	…	 can	 change	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 equal	 human	 rights	 of	women	
and	 non-Muslims	 through	 internal	 debate	within	 present	 Islamic	 societies”,	




are	 required	 to	 ‘prove’	 their	 allegiance	 to	 the	human	 rights	 paradigm	while	
others	are	not	expected	or	required	to	do	so”	and	that	“Muslims	are	more	likely	
to	resist	commitment	to	these	rights	when	they	are	presented	as	being	alone	




in 2003 as a “colonial venture” which by definition is “the usurpation of the 
sovereignty of a people by military conquest without legal justification” as  well 
as a “reckless and unaccountable invasion and occupation was neither justified 
by	self-defense	principles	nor	authorized	by	the	Security	Council	of	the	United	









have	happened	without	 the	 support	 of	 a	wider	 constituency	on	each	 side,	 a	
much wider circle of complicity for having justified, condoned or facilitated 
those	acts	of	violence”	(p.	9).
In	 relation	 to	 human	 rights,	 he	 asserts	 that	 “Muslims	must	 exercise	 their	
human agency in choosing peaceful co-existence and mediation of conflict 
Abdullahi An-Na’imxxx
over	 the	 arbitrary	 and	 indiscriminate	 use	 of	 violence	 to	 achieve	 political	
objectives”	 (p.	 8).	Thus	he	notes	 that	 despite	 the	 “worst	 of	 times”	 scenario	
confronting	Muslim	societies,	 “this	 is	 also	 the	 ‘best	of	 times’	 for	a	positive	
engagement	 of	 international	 legality	 and	 peaceful	 co-existence”	 and	 that	
among	the	many	lessons	and	insights	that	can	be	drawn	by	all	societies	from	
the	 atrocities	 of	 September	 	 is	 what	 he	 describes	 as	 “our	 shared	 human	
vulnerability	–	the	recognition	that	all	human	beings	everywhere	are	vulnerable	











but	 also	 possibilities	 of	 change	 in	 relevant	 attitudes	 and	 practices”	 (pp.	 9–
0).	He	concludes	inter alia	that	the	point	“is	simply	to	say	that	the	practical	
relevance	and	utility	of	the	social	order	of	Islam	are	contingent	upon	human	
understanding and practice, which testifies to its ability to provide for the 
practical	needs	of	its	adherents.	This	point	is	critical	for	the	theological	basis	of	
the	relationship	between	Islam	and	human	rights	today”	and	that	“these	are	the	
best of times and the worst of times for Muslims, with infinite possibilities in 
either	direction,	dependent	on	the	way	we	all	use	or	abuse	our	human	agency”	
(p.	).
III. Some Topical Issues in Islam and Human Rights Discourse
Within the general theme of Islam and human rights, there are specific 
substantive	topical	issues	that	usually	feature	prominently	in	the	discourse.	In	
the five essays contained in this part of the book, An-Na’im addresses some 
of	those	topical	substantive	issues,	namely,	the	questions	of	apostasy,	religious	
minorities,	women’s	rights,	freedom	of	expression	and jihad, respectively. 
The	part	opens	with	the	eleventh	essay,	“The	Islamic	Law	of	Apostasy	and	







the	 adoption	 of	 the	UDHR	 in	 948	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 this	 contradicts	 the	
prohibition	and	punishment	of	 apostasy	under	 traditional	 Islamic	 law.0	An-



















in	 contradiction	 with	more	 universally	 accepted	 standards	 of	 constitutional	




with	 very	 real	 and	 fundamental	 questions”	 (p.	 ).	 He	 then	 analyses	 the	
traditional	legal	basis	of	the	offence	under	Islamic	law	and	its	civil	and	human	
rights	implications	in	modern	times.	He	examines	and	critiques	the	different	
approaches advanced by different modernist Muslim scholars and identifies 
what,	in	his	view	are	the	shortcomings	of	each	of	those	approaches.	In	the	end	
he	again	proposes	Ustadh	Mahmoud	Taha’s	approach	as	a	new	approach	and	
best	method	for	dealing	with	 the	 issue	of	apostasy	under	 traditional	 Islamic	
law	in	relation	to	the	right	to	freedom	of	religion	under	modern	international	
human	rights	law.
0	 The	 prohibition	 and	 punishment	 of	 apostasy	 under	 traditional	 Islamic	 law	 is	
currently	 a	 hotly	 debated	 issue	 amongst	 contemporary	 Muslim	 scholars.	 See e.g.	
M.	Baderin,	 International Human Rights and Islamic Law	 (Oxford:	OUP,	00)	pp.	
–;	S.	El-Awa,	Punishment in Islamic Law	(Indianapolis:	IIIT,	98)	pp.	0–6;	
M.	H.	Kamali,	Freedom of Expression in Islam	(Cambridge:	ITS,	997)	pp.	87–07.
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The	 twelfth	 essay,	 “Religious	 Minorities	 under	 Islamic	 Law	 and	 the	
Limits of Cultural Relativism” was first published in 1987. In it An-Na’im 
addresses	the	issue	of	religious	minorities	under	Islamic	law	within	the	context	
of	 cultural	 relativistivism	 in	 human	 rights	 discourse.	 He	 begins	 with	 the	
argument	that,	“Non-Muslim	minorities	within	an	Islamic	state	do	not	enjoy	
rights	equal	 to	 those	of	 the	Muslim	majority”.	He	also	notes	 that	“although	
most	of	the	constitutions	of	modern	Muslim	states	guarantee	against	religious	
discrimination,	most	 of	 these	 constitutions	 also	 authorize	 the	 application	of	
Shari’ah”	which,	 he	 argues	 is	 contradictory	 and	 raises	 important	 questions	
for urgent and candid discussion. He first anticipates and counteracts what he 
identifies as “possible arguments which may be used to justify or rationalize 
the	 inferior	status	of	 religious	minorities	under	Shari’ah”	(p.	).	The	article	
then	provides	an	extensive	analysis	of	cultural	 relativism	and	human	rights,	













Against	 that	 background,	An-Na’im	 then	 discusses	 the	 issue	 of	 religious	
minorities	 under	 Shari’ah,	 observing	 that	 traditional	 Shari’ah	 must	 be	
understood	in	the	context	of	the	prevailing	period	of	its	development	and	that	
“now	 that	 the	problems	have	changed,	 and	 the	historical	 answers	 ceased	 to	
be	valid	…	new	answers	must	be	developed	out	of	the	Qur’an	and	Sunnah”,	
which	are	the	main	sources	of	Islamic	law,	and	that	those	new	answers	“would	
be	the	Islamic	Shari’ah	of	today”	rather	than	the	historical	Shari’ah. To find 
new answers to the issue of religious minorities in Muslim states, he first 
outlines	the	historical	Shari’ah	positions	on	the	issue	and	argues	that	were	we	
to	apply	those	historical	Shari’ah principles	“to	a	modern	nation-state,	such	












and	 even	 contribute	 to	 the	 further	 development	 of	 the	 current	 universal	
standards”	and	then	proceeds	to	outline	“one	way	in	which	Shari’ah	can	be	
brought	into	full	accord	with	universal	human	rights”	particularly	the	rights	of	
religious minorities (p. 14). He argues in the end that “it is my firm conviction 
that	Shari’ah	 has	 developed	 in	 the	 only	way	 it	 should,	 and	 could	 possibly,	












Muslim Context” was first published in 1987. In it, An-Na’im discusses “some 
aspects	of	the	relationship	between	[historical]	Shari’a	and	current	international	
standards on the rights of women” (p. 492). The essay first analyses the main 





legal	 personality,	 including	 the	 capacity	 to	 hold	 and	 dispose	 of	 property	 in	
their own right, a specific share in inheritance, access to education… and 
some	participation	 in	public	 life”	 (p.	49).	He	notes	 that	while	“[t]his	 level	
of	achievement		may	not	appear	impressive	by	some	modern	standards,	…	it	
has made very significant improvements in women’s rights when viewed in 
historical	perspectives”,	thereby	reaching	the	conclusion	that	“Shari’a	on	the	





legal	 systems	 or	 when	 judged	 by	 the	 emerging	 international	 standards”	
(p.	49).	He	thus	points	out	that	this	needs	to	change,	arguing	that	“the	provisions	







equality	 between	men	 and	women	 is	 achievable	 and	must	 be	 our	 objective	
in	 the	Muslim	world	 today”	but	 rather	 it	 is	 the	 ideal	of	substantive	equality	
between	men	and	women	that	must	be	realistically	pursued.	He	further	argues	
in	 that	 regard	 that	 complete	 emancipation	 of	 women	 in	 the	Muslim	world	
cannot	 be	 fully	 achieved	 through	 secular	movements	 and	 that	 the	 best	way	
to	achieve	women’s	rights	“is	 through	what	may	be	described	as	alternative	
Islamization	through	the	reformation	of	Shari’a”	(p.	00),	by	which	he	means	

















Case of Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic Contexts” was first 
published	in	997.	An-Na’im	starts	by	citing	example	of	incidents	on	freedom	





and	dynamics	of	 internal	and	external	variables	 in	 relation	 to	 the	normative	
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and	 empirical	 standing	 of	 freedom	 of	 expression	 at	 both	 the	 domestic	 and	
international	levels”,	the	understanding	of	which	he	argues	is	“necessary	for	





national	 unity,	 political	 stability,	 and	 economic	 development,	 even	 as	 they	
safeguard	their	cultural	and	religious	integrity,	are	all	better	served	by	a	greater	
protection	 and	 promotion	 of	 freedom	 of	 expression	 than	 by	 its	 violation”	
(p.	).	He	also	addresses	the	issue	of	universality	of	freedom	of	expression	
before	 discussing	 freedom	 of	 expression	 in	 African	 and	 Islamic	 contexts.	
With	 regard	 to	 the	 African	 and	 Islamic	 contexts,	 he	 observes	 that	 “[t]he	
post-independence	 experiences	 of	 almost	 all	African	 and	 Islamic	 countries	
…	 clearly	 show	 that	 decades	 of	 bad	 planning	 and	 poor	 implementation	 of	
economic	 policies,	 corruption	 and	 incompetence	 were	 sustained	 in	 part	
through	systematic	denial	of	freedom	of	expression”	(p.	46).	He,	among	others,	
discusses	 the	 Egyptian	 case	 of	 Nasr	 Hamd	Abu	 Zaid,	 which,	 he	 observes,	









The fifteenth essay,  “Why should Muslims abandon jihad?:	Human	Rights	
and the Future of International Law” was first published in 2006. An-Nai’m’s 
intention	 here	 is	 to,	 realistically	 and	 rhetorically,	 question	 “the	 basis	 of	
prohibitions	of	jihad	and	upholding	the	universality	of	human	rights	in	ways	
that can reaffirm the commitment of Muslims to international legality”. The 























The	 essay	 also	 addresses	 the	 issue	 of	 how	 international	 and	 lawful	 is	
international law, wherein he tries to “affirm and promote  the legitimacy and 





and	 implemented	 by	 all	 human	 societies,	 not	 something	 that	 some	 may	
choose	to	ignore	while	others	are	required	to	observe	it”.	He	asserts	that	under	
international	law	“the	use	of	military	force	is	not	allowed	except		in	accordance	




or	 Islamic	 jihad”	(p.	787).	He	 then	states	 that	“It	 is	 incoherent	and	futile	 to	
prohibit	aggressive	Islamic	jihad	without	doing	the	same	for	any	use	of	force	
outside	the	ambit	of	the	UN	Charter	in	the	name	of	national	self-interest.	From	





and	unaccountable	 that	 they	 undermine	 the	 very	 possibility	 of	 international	
law”.	He	further	emphasises	the	fact	that	“it	is	futile	for	state	actors	to	demand	
observance	of	international	law	principles	by	non-state	actors	when	they	are	


















violence	 in	 the	 furtherance	 of	 political	 ends,	 whoever	 the	 perpetrators	 and	
however we may feel about their alleged justification” (p. 796).
IV. Conclusion: A Theory of Interdependence
The	 sixteenth	 and	 last	 essay	 in	 this	 volume	harnesses	 all	 three	 elements	 of	
Abdullah	An-Na’im’s	 general	 philosophy	 on	 Islam	 and	 human	 rights.	 The	
essay,	 “The	 Interdependence	 of	 Religion,	 Secularism,	 and	 Human	 Rights”,	










human rights, regulating the role of religion in public life, and affirming the 
positive	place	of	secularism	in	Islamic	societies”	(p.	7).	He	then	analyses	the	
moral	and	philosophical	foundation	of	human	rights	as	well	as	its	universality,	
the exclusivity of religion and specificity of secularism. As earlier noted in 
Chapter 4, this is a slight departure from, or modification of, his earlier position 
adduced	in	Chapter	,	where	he	had	initially	asserted,	inter alia,	that:	“Muslim	
belief	precludes	a	purely	secular	approach	 to	 law	and	 the	state”	and	argued	
therefore that “the benefits of western secularism in the Muslim world are 
temporary”	 (p.	).	The	current	position	should	however	be	understood	 in	
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the context of his deconstruction and redefinition of the concept of secularism 
in	Chapter	4	as	well	as	in	the	present	essay,	where	he	states,	 inter alia,	 that	
“[w]idespread	confusion	and	suspicion	are	attendant	on	the	term	secularism	
especially	in	Islamic	societies,	which	regard	it	as	a	European,	Christian	concept	





three	 paradigms,	 i.e.	 religion,	 secularism,	 and	 human	 rights,	 is	 an	 enabling	
factor of human agency and equally susceptible to be influenced by it”. The 
question	 therefore	 is	 “how	 to	 secure	 the	 best	 conditions	 for	 human	 agency	
to	achieve	the	transformations	required”	(p.	64).	While	he	notes	the	fact	that	
“[h]uman	agency	is	always	integral	to	the	interpretation	and	implementation	






and human rights on the other, and finally how secularism also depends on 
both	religion	and	human	rights.	He	proceeds	to	analyse	this	interdependence	
in	Islamic	contexts	with	examples	again	from	the	issue	of	women’s	rights	in	












methodology	of	his	mentor	Ustadh	Mahmoud	Mohamed	Taha,	 and	 (iii)	 the	








is no doubt that he is a great scholar whose views make significant contributions 
to	human	rights	discourse	generally	and	to	the	topic	of	Islam	and	human	rights	
particularly.	The	factual	point	is	that	the	questions	he	raises	and	engages	with	
regarding	 the	 relationship	 between	 Islam	 and	 human	 rights	 in	 the	 modern	
world	generally	and	in	modern	Muslim	states	particularly,	are	very	valid	and	
complex	questions,	which	he	himself	acknowledges	could	be	addressed	from	
many	different	perspectives.	He	states,	 for	example,	 in	Chaper	4	 that	“I	am	
not	suggesting	the	collapse	of	all	related	ideas,	institutions,	and	policies	into	
the	framework	I	am	describing.	My	purpose	here	is	to	highlight	the	dynamics	
of	 one	 complex	 process	 that	 might	 contribute	 to	 individual	 freedom	 and	
social	justice”.	As	the	discourse	continues	and	as	Muslims	and	human	rights	
advocates	continue	to	seek	answers	to	these	complex	but	valid	questions,	there	
is	no	doubt	that	Abdullahi	Ahmed	An-Na’im’s	thoughts	as	expressed	in	these	
essays	will	continue	to	be	relevant	to	the	debates	on	the	subject	for	a	very	long	
time,	which	indicates	the	importance	of	this	volume.	Happy	reading!
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